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At the local, state, and federal levels, governments increasingly use 
artificial intelligence (AI) tools to support decisionmaking about public 
services, government benefits, and legal punishments.1  For instance, Penn-
 
* Edward B. Shils Professor of Law and Professor of Political Science, Director of the 
Penn Program on Regulation, University of Pennsylvania. 
** Associate, Hogan Lovells US LLP 
1. Cary Coglianese & Lavi M. Ben Dor, AI in Adjudication and Administration, BROOK. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2021) (on file with authors).  By the terms “artificial intelligence” or “AI 
tools,” we mean to encompass a broad class of computer programs or digital algorithms that 
travel under a variety of other names, such as machine learning, machine-learning algorithms, 
predictive analytics, algorithmic governance, and Big Data.  This class of diverse tools can 
take many forms but each is linked by a common reliance on “an automated process of 
discovering correlations . . . between variables in a dataset, often to make predictions or 
estimates of some outcome.”  David Lehr & Paul Ohm, Playing with the Data: What Legal Scholars 
Should Learn About Machine Learning, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 653, 671 (2017).  Today, such tools 
can be found in ordinary smart phones or other off-the-shelf products.  Although the issues 
we discuss here could technically apply to such out-of-the-box, mass-produced products, our 
principal focus is on custom digital products or other analytic services provided by consultants 
to meet specific agency needs, such as in identifying potential targets of inspections or 
enforcement actions, assisting with claims processing or other adjudications, or supporting 
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sylvania’s Allegheny County uses an AI assessment tool to prioritize follow-
up responses to phone calls alleging child abuse and neglect.2  AI also drives 
New York City’s “predictive policing” program by forecasting geographic 
locations of crime and supporting decisions about where to deploy police 
patrols.3  At the federal level, government agencies use AI tools to help 
identify possible cases of tax fraud or otherwise support regulatory 
enforcement.  One study found that the federal government is using AI 
technology to drive over 150 projects at agencies as varied as the Securities 
and Exchange Commission and the Social Security Administration.4   
These innovations have the potential to improve certain functions 
performed by the public sector by supporting more accurate, consistent, and 
timely decisions.5  The widespread use of AI by governments also raises a 
variety of accountability concerns.  Some of these concerns arise because 
AI—also commonly referred to as machine learning—is driven by 
algorithms that are not intuitively easy to interpret.6  The relative opacity of 
machine-learning algorithms has earned them the moniker of “black box 
algorithms.”7  To the extent that pivotal decisionmaking relies upon what 
occurs only within a “black box”—that is, the internal workings of an 
algorithm—the public may look skeptically on governmental use of these 
 
agency rulemaking.  See generally Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Regulating by Robot: 
Administrative Decision Making in the Machine-Learning Era, 105 GEO. L.J. 1147 (2017).  
Furthermore, although our focus in this Article is on government contracting, many of the 
same issues we discuss should be considered when private firms contract for AI services. 
2. Dave Gershgorn, Algorithms Can’t Fix Societal Problems––and Often Amplify Them, QUARTZ 
(Oct. 17, 2018), https://qz.com/1427159/algorithms-cant-fix-societal-problems-and-often-
amplify-them/.  For context, see The Allegheny Family Screening Tool, ALLEGHENY CNTY., 
https://www.alleghenycounty.us/Human-Services/News-Events/Accomplishments/Allegh
eny-Family-Screening-Tool.aspx (last visited May 18, 2021).  
3. The full extent of New York City’s “predictive policing” policies came to light in 2017 
following a lawsuit by the Brennan Center for Justice.  See Ali Winston, Transparency Advocates 
Win Release of NYPD “Predictive Policing” Documents, INTERCEPT (Jan. 27, 2018, 11:58 AM), 
https://theintercept.com/2018/01/27/nypd-predictive-policing-documents-lawsuit-crime-
forecasting-brennan/ (describing the full extent of the policies, including surveillance cameras 
and facial recognition technology). 
4. See DAVID FREEMAN ENGSTROM, ET AL., GOVERNMENT BY ALGORITHM: ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE IN FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES, ADMIN. CONF. U.S. (2020). 
5. CARY COGLIANESE, A FRAMEWORK FOR GOVERNMENTAL USE OF MACHINE 
LEARNING, ADMIN. CONF. U.S. (2020). 
6. Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 1, at 1156–60; Lehr & Ohm, supra note 1, at 655–56. 
7. FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT 
CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION 3 (2016). 
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tools.8  A lack of transparency over governmental uses of AI also exacerbates 
serious concerns about inaccuracies in algorithmic forecasts and the racial 
and gender biases that AI tools may perpetuate, especially when using data 
that already reflect such biases.9  
Some advocacy organizations, such as the Electronic Privacy Information 
Center, have sued government agencies under the Freedom of Information 
Act, seeking details on the government’s use of algorithms.10  Other litigants 
have filed lawsuits in both state and federal courts raising procedural due 
process claims and citing the lack of algorithmic transparency provided by 
government agencies.11  Without question, agencies that choose to use AI tools 
need to be mindful of the possibility that their choices could later come under 
not just the spotlight of media attention but also the scrutiny of judicial review. 
Some decisions by state and federal government officials to use AI 
technologies will also undoubtedly prompt calls for legislative oversight and 
standards.  Local, state, and federal lawmakers have already entered the fray 
by proposing legislation that would address concerns about certain uses of AI 
tools.12  In addition, the Administrative Conference of the United States 
 
8. See, e.g., David Freeman Engstrom & Daniel E. Ho, Algorithmic Accountability in the 
Administrative State, 37 YALE J. REG. 800, 821 (2020); Ryan Calo & Danielle Keats Citron, The 
Automated Administrative State: A Crisis of Legitimacy, 70 EMORY L.J. 797 (2021).  Even the use of 
machine-learning algorithms by private sector entities has created some alarm.  See, e.g., 
PASQUALE, supra note 7 (offering a cautionary account of the use of machine-learning 
algorithms in different aspects of individuals’ daily lives). 
9. See, e.g., CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION (1st ed. 2016); VIRGINIA 
EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY: HOW HIGH-TECH TOOLS PROFILE, POLICE, AND 
PUNISH THE POOR (2018); see also Joy Buolamwini & Timnit Gebru, Gender Shades: Intersectional 
Accuracy Disparities in Commercial Gender Classification, 81 PROC. MACH. LEARNING RES. 1, 8 
(2018) (showing empirically that commercial facial recognition software programmed with AI 
is far less accurate when asked to identify women’s faces or those of people of color).  
10. See, e.g., EPIC v. DOJ (Criminal Justice Algorithms), ELEC. PRIV. INFO. CTR., 
https://epic.org/foia/doj/criminal-justice-algorithms/#foiadocuments (last visited May 18, 
2021) (cataloging documents released to the Electronic Privacy Information Center as the 
result of Freedom of Information Act litigation against the government concerning criminal 
justice algorithms).  
11. See, e.g., State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749 (Wis. 2016); State v. Rogers, No. 14-0373, 
2015 WL 869323 (W. Va. Jan. 9, 2015); Malenchik v. State, 928 N.E.2d 564 (Ind. 2010); 
People v. Wakefield, 107 N.Y.S.3d 487 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019); see generally Coglianese & Ben 
Dor, supra note 1, at 12–15. 
12. Some cities, for example, have responded to concerns about the use of facial 
recognition tools driven by artificial intelligence.  See BERKELEY, CAL., MUN. CODE CH. 2 § 99 
(2020); OAKLAND, CAL., CODE OF ORDINANCES CH. 9 § 64 (2021); S.F. ADMIN. CODE CH. 
19.B (2021); SOMERVILLE, MASS., CODE OF ORDINANCES CH. 9 § 25 (2020).  The state of 
California has adopted related privacy legislation with implications for the use of algorithmic 
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(ACUS) has issued a statement intended to guide federal agencies when using 
AI,13 and the National Academy of Public Administration has issued a report 
offering its own guiding principles.14  President Donald Trump even signed 
a comprehensive executive order setting out standards for governmental 
AI—an order that, so far at least, President Biden has yet to revoke.15  
As government agencies turn more frequently to the use of AI, the 
pressure for legislative or judicial action to govern the use of these tools may 
only grow.  But a rush to do something to regulate the rapid growth of AI––
and in particular its use by government––could result in painting with too 
 
tools.  See California Privacy Rights Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.185(16) (West 2021).  For a 
catalog of state legislation related to artificial intelligence, see Legislation Related to Artificial 
Intelligence, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEG., https://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-
information-technology/2020-legislation-related-to-artificial-intelligence.aspx (last updated 
Jan. 17, 2021) (tracking relevant state legislation, including whether the proposed legislation 
was enacted).  At the federal level, legislation targeting the use of digital algorithms has been 
proposed but not adopted.  See, e.g., Algorithmic Accountability Act of 2019, H.R. 2231, 116th 
Cong. (2019) (proposing that the Federal Trade Commission require private companies “that 
use, store, or share personal information to conduct automated decision system impact 
assessments and data protection impact assessments”).  Abroad, the European Union has 
adopted the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR): Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural 
persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, 
and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (Data Protection Directive), OJ 2016 L 119/1. 
13. ACUS, Agency Use of Artificial Intelligence, 86 Fed. Reg. 6612, 6616–18 (Jan. 22, 
2021).  One of the authors of this Article served as a consultant to the Administrative 
Conference of the United States (ACUS) on its artificial intelligence project and was closely 
involved in drafting the agency’s statement.  See COGLIANESE, supra note 5. 
14. Joseph J. Avery et al., Using Artificial Intelligence to Improve the Fairness and Equity of Government 
Decision Making, PRINCETON PROJECT COMPUTATIONAL L. (2020), https://
www.napawash.org/uploads/Using_AI_to_Improve_the_Fairness_and_Equity_of_Governme
nt_Decision_Making.pdf.  For other guidelines for governmental use of AI tools, see, e.g., IBM 
CTR. FOR THE BUS. OF GOV’T & P’SHIP FOR PUB. SERV., MORE THAN MEETS AI: ASSESSING 
THE IMPACT OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE ON THE WORK OF GOVERNMENT 4 (2019) 
(presenting a framework for understanding government use of artificial intelligence); IBM CTR. 
FOR THE BUS. OF GOV’T & P’SHIP FOR PUB. SERV, MORE THAN MEETS AI: PART II: BUILDING 
TRUST, MANAGING RISK 6 (2019) (operationalizing that framework, albeit with only a passing 
mention of the impact of procurement policy); Chris Bousquet & Stephen Goldsmith, The Right 
Way to Regulate Algorithms, BLOOMBERG CITYLAB (Mar. 20, 2018, 11:47 AM), https://www.city 
lab.com/equity/2018/03/the-right-way-to-regulate-algorithms/555998/ (laying out four “basic 
requirements” for local governments when considering using artificial intelligence to automate 
certain municipal responsibilities, such as “[s]har[ing] the motivation for using an algorithm” 
and “[e]xplain[ing] what data went into the model and why”). 
15. Exec. Order No. 13,960, 85 Fed. Reg. 78,939 (Dec. 3, 2020). 
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broad a brush and sacrificing its potential value.  AI does have real potential 
to improve government services or reduce administrative costs.16  Yet some 
critics seem to paint machine learning as inherently unfair or categorically 
condemn all use of AI by government agencies.  Any policy proposal that 
would altogether ban or significantly curtail the use of AI by government 
would deny society the benefits that the responsible use of such technology 
promises.17  We propose instead, at least as a starting point, that government 
agencies leverage the procurement process more effectively to reassure the 
public that government is using algorithmic tools responsibly.18  
Not many government agencies possess the in-house expertise to develop 
and implement algorithmic software, which means that they often resort to 
purchasing such services—including technology support—from third-party 
 
16. See generally Jane E. Fountain, The Virtual State: Transforming American Government, 90 
NAT. CIVICS REV. 241 (2001) (discussing benefits from governmental reliance on digital 
technologies).   
17. See, e.g., JOSHUA NEW & DANIEL CASTRO, CTR. FOR DATA INNOVATION, HOW 
POLICYMAKERS CAN FOSTER ALGORITHMIC ACCOUNTABILITY 1 (2018) (expressing 
skepticism about proposals to regulate algorithmic accountability in ways that “would lead to 
less AI use, thereby hindering social and economic progress”). 
18. Although strikingly little attention has been paid to the use of procurement as an AI 
governance tool, we cannot claim to be entirely alone in pointing to its importance.  The statement 
issued by ACUS, for example, acknowledges that government agencies may need to procure AI 
services from third-party vendors.  86 Fed. Reg. at 6617.  The World Economic Forum has issued a 
set of guidelines for procuring AI systems.  WORLD ECON. F., GUIDELINES FOR AI PROCUREMENT 5 
(2019) [hereinafter WEF GUIDELINES] (outlining broad global regulatory principles regarding artificial 
intelligence procurement resulting from an industry consultation).  See also World Econ. F., AI 
Procurement in a Box: AI Government Procurement Guidelines (June 2020),  http://www3.we 
forum.org/docs/WEF_AI_Procurement_in_a_Box_AI_Government_Procurement_Guideli
nes_2020.pdf.  Some governments have started to issue their own AI procurement guidelines.  
U.K. Office for Artificial Intelligence, Guidelines for AI Procurement (June 8, 2020), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/guidelines-for-ai-procurement/guidelines-for-
ai-procurement; New South Wales Government, Sourcing an AI Solution (Sept. 4, 2020), 
https://www.digital.nsw.gov.au/policy/artificial-intelligence-ai/user-guide/sourcing-ai-solution.  
In the legal literature, we are aware of only two extended works that discuss procurement of 
AI in any depth.  See Deirdre K. Mulligan & Kenneth A. Bamberger, Procurement as Policy: 
Administrative Process for Machine Learning, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 773, 781, 791 (2019) 
(describing the deficiencies of normal government procurement process for providing public 
input into and oversight of automated systems); David S. Rubenstein, Acquiring Ethical AI, 73 
FLA. L. REV. __ (Oct. 1, 2020) (unpublished manuscript on file with the authors) (proposing 
“a set of concrete regulatory reforms to center ethical AI throughout the procurement process: 
from acquisition planning through market solicitation, negotiation, and contractual award”).   
In the present Article, we intend to focus on key themes and principles that ought to guide 
government officials when contracting for AI services. 
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vendors.19  The contracts between government agencies and third-party 
vendors thus provide an important tool for ensuring both the responsible 
design of AI tools and overall accountability of their use.20  A more deliberate 
approach to government contracting for AI systems could help protect 
agencies that use AI tools in the event of subsequent litigation, while also 
providing much-needed safeguards for protecting the interests of individuals 
and organizations subjected to the use of such tools.  
A contracting approach to algorithmic accountability holds several advan-
tages.  First, contracting for algorithmic accountability is a highly actionable 
and adaptable approach, one that can be implemented immediately.  
Procurement officers do not need to wait for legislative action to ensure that 
contracts for AI services contain provisions that promote algorithmic 
accountability, such as by providing for appropriate public access to basic 
information about algorithms’ design and functioning.  Government contracts 
could also impose a series of responsible AI standards on vendors, such as 
provisions calling for data privacy, bias detection, transparency, algorithmic 
validation, and cybersecurity measures.  In short, careful drafting of contracts 
for AI services paired with suitably robust public input over the provisions to 
be included in these contracts can allow procurement officers to assure the 
public that agencies are using AI tools responsibly.   
Second, unlike legislative efforts, which may require broad, sweeping 
regulatory language, a contracting approach can be tailored to meet the needs 
of specific agencies while balancing the accountability concerns posed by 
particular use cases.  A contracting approach to algorithmic accountability is 
also more adaptable than a legislative approach; over time, agencies can 
experiment with new contract terms and gradually evolve procurement norms 
to map onto ever-changing technologies.   
Finally, by imposing standards for transparency and responsible use of AI in 
public contracts, government agencies can advance a meaningful expressive 
purpose about responsible AI practices throughout the industry.21  When govern-
ments insist on contract terms that require robust practices related to algorithmic 
 
19. Private vendors seem more than happy to meet this new demand.  See Tod Newcombe, 
Is Government Ready for AI?, GOV’T TECH. (July/Aug. 2018), https://www.govtech.com/ 
products/Is-Government-Ready-for-AI.html (“The vendor community is increasingly turning its 
attention to the government market, as far as AI is concerned.”). 
20. Throughout this Article, what we mean by accountability focuses on governmental 
entities’ respect for important values implicated by their use of AI tools and well as these 
entities’ ability to assure members of the public affected by AI tools, including litigants who 
seek judicial review, of the fair and responsible use of these tools. 
21. OECD, INTEGRATING RESPONSIBLE BUSINESS CONDUCT IN PUBLIC PROCURE-
MENT 35 (2020).  
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accountability, vendors may well find that it becomes easier to shift to these 
practices for all of their clients.  In this way, the expectations that governments 
insist upon in their procurement contracts can help set the bar for algorithmic 
accountability throughout the economy, promoting the diffusion of norms 
about responsible AI across both the public and private sectors. 
I. PROCUREMENT AS AI GOVERNANCE 
Public procurement is a lucrative part of the economy.  In the United 
States, one recent estimate places the annual value of the federal 
government’s procurement contracts at approximately $500 billion.22  In 
addition, fifty state governments and many more municipal governments 
engage in their own extensive procurement of goods and services, making 
government procurement overall a substantial portion of the nation’s 
economic activity in any given year.23  Of course, only a fraction of 
government contracting today deals with AI tools.  Nevertheless, the perva-
siveness of contracting does mean that governments at all levels have 
established processes to ensure that government monies are spent wisely, 
vendors complete the work for which they were hired, and the procurement 
process is transparent and accountable to the public.24  These same 
established processes can be used to help advance other social goals, 
including the responsible public sector use of AI tools. 
At the federal level in the United States, vendors themselves already 
enforce accountability norms through an adversarial process known as a “bid 
protest.”25  This process allows “prospective bidders and offerors [to] 
challenge flawed solicitations before the [bidding deadline].”26  It also 
permits “disappointed bidders or offerors [to] challenge flaws in the award 
process” after the award of a contract.27  Bid protests are but one mechanism 
 
22. Christopher R. Yukins, The U.S. Federal Procurement System: An Introduction, 3 
PROCUREMENT L.J. 69, 69 n.1 (2017). 
23. Id. at 69 (noting that the “procurement market is one of the largest in the world”).   
24. See NAT’L INST. OF GOV’T PURCHASING (NGIP): THE INST. FOR PUB. PROCUREMENT, THE 
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT GUIDE FOR ELECTED AND SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS 1–2 (2016) 
(describing the importance of these mechanisms for the public officeholders allocating and admini-
stering government funds).  For further background on federal and state procurement law, see Richard 
O’Duvall et al., Public Procurement in the United States: Overview, PRACTICAL LAW (Mar. 1, 2013); AM. BAR 
ASS’N SECTION OF PUB. CONT. L. & SECTION OF STATE & LOCAL GOV’T L., THE 2000 MODEL 
PROCUREMENT CODE FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS (2000), https://www.americanbar.org/ 
content/dam/aba/administrative/public_contract_law/pcl-model-02-2000-code-procurement.pdf. 
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through which affected interests can keep government procurement 
processes in check.  Overall, a focus on accountability is core to American 
procurement law.28  Academics,29 practitioners,30 and members of the 
public31 have all voiced support for robust transparency requirements for 
public procurement processes.  For this reason, procurement officers should 
presumably already understand, if not appreciate, the value of accountability 
and transparency when it comes to governmental use of AI.32 
Procurement officials should also already be familiar with the use of 
government contracting more generally as a tool to promote social goals—a 
practice sometimes called “social,” “green,” or “sustainable” procurement.33   
Social procurement seeks to ensure that government contractors do not 
discriminate, violate labor laws, harm the environment, or otherwise engage 
in undesirable business practices.  Although procurement policies “were 
 
28. See generally Steven L. Schooner, Desiderata: Objectives for a System of Government Contract 
Law, 11 PUB. PROCUREMENT L. Rev. 103 (2002) (identifying and explaining pillars of U.S. 
procurement law). 
29. See, e.g., Jennifer Jo Snider Smith, Competition and Transparency: What Works for Public 
Procurement Reform, 38 PUB. CONT. L.J. 85, 87 (2008) (emphasizing the importance of competition 
and transparency to a well-functioning procurement system); see generally Vinod Rege, 
Transparency in Government Procurement, 35 J. WORLD TRADE 489, 489 (2001) (exploring the impact 
of the World Trade Organization’s transparency proposals on developing countries).  
30. See NGIP: INST. FOR PUB. PROCUREMENT, TRANSPARENCY IN GOVERNMENT; 
TRANSPARENCY IN GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT 1 (2010) (providing observations on the 
importance of transparency in government contracting from the point of view of a trade 
association representing procurement professionals).  
31. Public discussion about procurement even turned political under the Trump 
Administration, as procurement policy became a bit of a political football.  See Steven Overly & 
Jacqueline Feldscher, Trump Pledges to ‘Look’ at $10B Pentagon Contract Amid Complaints About Amazon, 
POLITICO (July 18, 2019, 5:57 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/07/18/trump-
10b-pentagon-contract-amazon-1422011 (reporting that the White House was actively 
considering intervening in the Department of Defense’s decision to award an extremely 
large cloud computing contract to Amazon, a company owned by a political rival of the 
President); see also Dorothy Robyn, A Disturbance in the Force: President Trump, DOD’s JEDI 
Procurement, and the Old Post Office, BROOKINGS INST. (Aug. 23, 2019), https://www.brook 
ings.edu/blog/fixgov/2019/08/23/dods-jedi-procurement-and-the-old-post-office/ (covering 
the same set of events); Danny Vinik, Trump’s $440 Billion Weapon, POLITICO (Dec. 22, 2016, 8:57 
PM),   https://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2016/12/trump-federal-contracts-weapon-
000262 (detailing the President’s stated interest in “the arcane, bureaucratic function of federal 
procurement”).  
32. Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Transparency and Algorithmic Governance, 71 ADMIN.  
L. REV. 1 (2019). 
33. OECD, GOING GREEN: BEST PRACTICES FOR SUSTAINABLE PROCUREMENT (2015); 
Amy Ludlow, Social Procurement: Policy and Practice, 7 EUR. LAB. L.J. 479 passim (2016). 
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originally designed to achieve the best value for money by encouraging open 
competition” and fairness in bidding, over the years these policies have 
increasingly recognized that the public expects government officials to take 
“a full life-cycle approach, including the consideration of environmental and 
social costs.”34  Local, state, and federal government procurement rules and 
programs have, for example, sought to advance social justice by promoting 
contracting with businesses owned by women and individuals from 
underrepresented racial communities.35  
Some research suggests that sustainable procurement has the secondary 
benefit of advancing social justice by diffusing social norms about best 
business practices throughout the private sector.  For example, in California, 
cities that require their public construction contracts to comply with 
otherwise voluntary energy efficiency standards known as LEED see a 
greater proportion of private construction companies that also comply with 
LEED standards.36  Even towns that surround these cities reportedly see an 
increase in LEED compliance.37 
Public procurement contracts at the local, state, and federal level could 
easily be revised to include provisions requiring compliance with otherwise 
voluntary standards for the responsible use of AI.  For example, the 
professional engineering society, the Institute of Electrical and Electronics 
Engineers (IEEE), is developing a suite of voluntary standards that apply to 
both the technical and social aspects of AI development and deployment.38   
The organization AlgorithmWatch has compiled a list of over 150 different 
sets of voluntary standards or principles for the responsible use of AI.39   
 
34. OECD, supra note 33, at 19. 
35. Contracting Assistance Programs, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., https://www.sba.gov
/federal-contracting/contracting-assistance-programs (last visited May 18, 2021); Chris 
Burrell, The Color of Public Money: Philadelphia and Massport Show Paths to Expanding Minority 
Contracts, GBH NEWS (Jan. 4, 2020), https://www.wgbh.org/news/local-news/2020/
01/14/the-color-of-public-money-philadelphia-and-massport-show-paths-to-expanding-min 
ority-contracts; Courtney Buble, Biden Administration Likely To Increase Contracting Opportunities 
for Small and Minority-Owned Businesses, GOV’T EXEC. (Dec. 29, 2020), https://www. 
govexec.com/management/2020/12/biden-administration-likely-increase-contracting-oppotuni 
ties-small-and-minority-owned-businesses/171031/. 
36. Timothy Simcoe & Michael W. Toffel, Government Green Procurement Spillovers: Evidence 
from Municipal Building Policies in California, 68 J. ENV’T ECON. & MGMT. 411 passim (2014). 
37. Id. 
38. Artificial Intelligence Systems (AIS) Related Standards, IEEE STANDARDS ASS’N, 
https://standards.ieee.org/initiatives/artificial-intelligence-systems/standards.html (last 
visited May 18, 2021). 
39. About, AI ETHICS GUIDELINES GLOB. INVENTORY (Apr. 2020), https://inven 
tory.algorithmwatch.org/about. 
 
184 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW ACCORD [6:3 
Standards and principles such as these could be readily incorporated into public 
contracts for AI services, with procurement officials specifying compliance with 
such standards as an explicit contractual obligation of AI vendors. 
II. KEY ISSUES TO ADDRESS IN AI CONTRACTS  
 We highlight four specific issues that government officials should consider 
when drafting contracts for AI tools and services: trade secrets, privacy and 
cybersecurity, auditing, and public participation.  For each issue, we endeavor 
to provide a brief, actionable summary of relevant law as well as options for 
government officials to consider.  We invite procurement officers and agency 
officials to take into account a suite of potential strategies that, if embedded in 
AI contracts, could meaningfully enhance algorithmic accountability in 
practice.  Our aim is to offer suggestions—not necessarily to dictate precise 
contract terms.  Which provisions should be added to new contracts, and the 
exact wording of any such contractual provision, will ultimately depend on 
agency practices, the technology at issue, the use to which it is being put, and 
the legal, policy, and even larger social and political context of a given agency 
and procurement process.40  
A. Transparency and Trade Secrets 
One challenge for procurement officers involves striking the right balance 
between respect for vendors’ legitimate trade secrets and the necessity of 
providing members of the public some form of visibility into automated 
government decisionmaking.41  For a piece of information to be a trade 
secret, it must not be widely known, its secrecy must generate commercial 
value, and it must be protected from disclosure.42  Naturally, technology and 
data analytics companies wish to keep information about their algorithms 
protected for competitive reasons.43  By contrast, although government 
agencies might in some instances have their own reasons for keeping the 
inner workings of algorithms secret (such as when they are used for law 
enforcement purposes),44 they will likely have much less reason to keep 
 
40. COGLIANESE, supra note 5.  See also Mulligan & Bamberger, supra note 18, at 812–813 
(distinguishing between the transparency and reason-giving necessitated by “inward-facing” 
versus “public-facing” digital systems). 
41. For more on the doctrine of trade secrets, see 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) (defining “trade 
secrets”). 
42. Id.  
43. David S. Levine & Ted Sichelman, Why Do Startups Use Trade Secrets, 94 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 751, 755–770 (2019). 
44. See, e.g., Joshua A. Kroll, et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 658 
(2017) (discussing potential for gaming government algorithms). 
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algorithmic secrets than will private firms.  Indeed, in many cases, 
government agencies will often have an affirmative interest in making the 
inner workings of their algorithms open to the public so as to promote public 
confidence in these tools or to defend their use in court.45  A tension over the 
transparency of algorithmic information will therefore often exist between 
the interests of government agencies and their vendors.  Procurement 
officials need to be mindful of this potential conflict and proactively structure 
their contracts to include transparency mechanisms that can protect 
government interests while also respecting vendors’ legitimate expectations 
to the secrecy of proprietary technologies.  
If agencies do not take transparency into account when drafting contracts 
for AI services, they risk allowing private vendors to assert overly broad 
claims for trade secrets protection.  Such broad claims have unfortunately 
been said too often to have “become the default way to protect algorithms.”46  
To be sure, some protection against disclosure of proprietary details might 
well be valid, perhaps especially if full disclosure would entirely destroy a 
company’s competitive advantage.  But to claim that any disclosure, however 
modest, would destroy the company’s value in its work product would 
overextend and abuse trade secret protection.47  Yet vendors have made 
precisely these claims to shield their algorithms from discovery in lawsuits 
relating to local and state government eligibility determinations for social 
assistance benefits.48  These vendors have with some consistency asserted 
trade secret protection and refused to allow plaintiffs to access information 
 
45. Government agencies also have an interest in maintaining their own access to 
information regarding algorithms they hire vendors to program.  See COGLIANESE, supra note 
5, at 74 (“[W]hen contracting out for technical support and services in developing a machine 
learning system, agencies should take into account the need to have access to and be able to 
disclose sufficient information about the algorithm, the underlying data, and the validation 
results to satisfy transparency norms.”). 
46. Sonia K. Katyal, Private Accountability in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, 66 UCLA L. REV. 
54, 125 (2019).  
47. Although no case presenting the question of the protectability of algorithmic 
information has reached the U.S. Supreme Court, the Court’s decision in Georgia v. 
Public.Resource.org, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1498 (2020) might well point in the direction of default toward 
transparency.  It suggests the possibility that any AI work performed under the supervision of 
government agencies that are related to or support authoritative decisions by those agencies will 
fall under the government edicts doctrine and not be protectable under copyright or perhaps 
other intellectual property laws.  Public.Resource.org, Inc., 140 S. Ct. at 1506. 
48. See, e.g., Hous. Fed’n of Teachers Local 2415 v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 251 F. Supp. 
3d 1168 (S.D. Tex. 2017); Michael T. v. Bowling, No. 2:15-cv-09655, 2016 WL 4870284, at 
*1, *16 (S.D. W. Va. Sept. 13, 2016), rev’d sub nom. Michael T. v. Crouch, 2018 WL 1513295 
(S.D. W. Va. Mar. 26, 2018); K.W. v. Armstrong, 298 F.R.D. 479 (D. Idaho Mar. 25, 2014).  
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about their algorithm—leaving the government vulnerable in due process 
litigation.49   
In Houston Federation of Teachers Local 2415 v. Houston Independent School 
District,50 for instance, a school system used an algorithm created by a private 
firm as part of its teacher performance evaluation process. 51  After the school 
district relied on the algorithm to determine whether to terminate teachers 
for poor performance, the local teachers’ union filed suit raising due process 
objections.  The court issued a preliminary decision allowing the plaintiff to 
take its case to a jury and emphasizing the lack of available information about 
the algorithm over which the private firm had claimed trade secret 
protection.52  The school district was thus unable to defend itself by providing 
the information that the plaintiff sought.  The court explained that, without 
access to information the firm possessed about how the school district’s 
algorithm operated, teachers lacked the ability to understand how the school 
board made decisions about their employment.  
This tension between trade secrets and due process rights is hardly 
irresolvable.  As it is, due process rights are far from absolute.  Prevailing 
doctrine instead calls upon courts to balance competing factors when 
evaluating the adequacy of agency procedures under the Due Process 
Clause.53  The choice, in other words, is not one between full disclosure and 
total trade secrecy.  With attentiveness to the need for balance, procurement 
officers should be able to insist that vendors disclose information needed to 
assure the public and any litigants that government AI tools are working 
properly and fairly, even if firms wish to insist upon protecting their source 
code or other commercially valuable information.54  
Agencies can strike the right balance by requiring that their contractors 
disclose enough information to allow the public (and courts) to see what an 
AI tool has been designed to accomplish and to validate the tool’s 
performance in meeting the desired objectives.55  In particular, government 
 
49. See Coglianese & Ben Dor, supra note 1, at 29.  
50. 251 F.Supp.3d 1168 (S.D. Tex. 2017). 
51. Id. at 1171. 
52. Id. at 1179 (“[W]ithout access to [the] proprietary information . . . [the teachers’ 
performance scores] will remain a mysterious ‘black box,’ impervious to challenge.”).  
53. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976) (providing the canonical 
articulation of this standard). 
54. The notion of a type of “quasi” or “qualified” transparency of algorithms is discussed 
further by Kroll et al., supra note 44, at 641, and Frank Pasquale, Beyond Innovation and 
Competition: The Need for Qualified Transparency in Internet Intermediaries, 104 NW. UNIV. L. REV. 
105, 163–64 (2010). 
55.  Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 32, at 40, 42. This recommendation is also important 
for government procurement officers in Europe, where the law protects a “right to an 
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contracts should include language stipulating that contractors will provide 
information to show that “(a) an algorithmic system was constructed to 
advance a legally valid purpose by revealing the goal of an algorithm, (b) it is 
functioning correctly to advance that purpose (i.e., the program is not 
malfunctioning and it is producing validated results), and (c) it is being used 
as intended.”56  
Likewise, just because a private firm might desire to keep information 
secret does not mean that it is entitled to trade secret protection.  Disclosing 
the goal of the algorithm—that is, its objective function—should surely never 
be treated as a trade secret, if only because the goal of the algorithm in 
question will likely have already been spelled out to some degree by the 
government in its request for proposals and will, in any case, never be the 
result of a firm’s business judgment.57  Validation protocols and results 
presumably also should never reveal any trade secrets either, as they are 
simply methods used to assess how well the algorithm performs in relation to 
the stated objective, not how it was designed or developed.58  Finally, it should 
also always be possible, without revealing any proprietary information, to 
provide affected individuals with their own specific data used by an AI tool to 
ensure it does not contain any errors.  Procurement officers can thus justifiably 
specify in their contracts that all of this information will be disclosable by the 
contractor.  Furthermore, such a contract could always provide that, for any 
information that is properly covered by trade secrets, the firm would consent 
 
explanation” when algorithmic decision tools are used. See GDPR, supra note 12, at Recital 71 
(making AI technologies “subject to suitable safeguards, which should include specific 
information to the data subject and the right to . . . . an explanation of the decision reached 
after such assessment and to challenge the decision.”). European law also imposes other 
requirements or limitations on automated decisionmaking other than what the law currently 
does in the United States. See id. (“The data subject should have the right not to be subject to 
a decision . . . . which is based solely on automated processing and which produces legal effects 
concerning him or her . . . .”). 
56. Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 32, at 47; cf. EUR. PARL., A GOVERNANCE 
FRAMEWORK FOR ALGORITHMIC ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY, 2019, PE 624.262, 
at 58, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2019/624262/EPRS
_STU(2019)624262_EN.pdf (indicating that trade secret protection should not extend to the 
existence of an algorithm or statements of the purposes for which it was developed). 
57. We acknowledge that sometimes the full objective function could contain proprietary 
features, such as when it includes certain additions for a process of regularization.  See Lehr & 
Ohm, supra note 1, at 704–05.  But this does not preclude a government contract from 
requiring that the contractor disclose the core parts of the function related to the government’s 
goal or at least stipulating to in camera review, if litigation should arise.  Coglianese & Lehr, 
supra note 32, at 49. 
58. Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 32, at 49. 
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to allowing a court to review such information in camera in the event of 
litigation over the government’s use of the algorithm in question.59  
Admittedly, the development and use of machine-learning algorithms 
produces information that could be solicited in litigation—including source 
code.  But ultimately, government transparency doctrines—whether the 
procedural prong of the Due Process Clause or the Freedom of Information 
Act—are pragmatic, not absolute, in what they demand of government 
agencies to disclose.60  In fact, that pragmatism has been on display in 
several cases already involving challenges to governmental use of 
algorithms.  Some courts have taken a less demanding approach than the 
court did in the Houston Federation of Teachers case and have acknowledged 
that due process does not require the disclosure of every detail about an 
algorithm relied on by the government.61 
In a case involving the use of a proprietary algorithm in criminal sentencing 
decisions, for example, the Wisconsin Supreme Court clarified that, even 
when a state’s vendor merely makes publicly available “a full list of variables 
used” by its algorithm, but does not disclose other details about the algorithm, 
it does necessarily deprive any affected persons of their due process rights.62  
That the court found limited disclosure passed constitutional muster is even 
more notable given the serious liberty interests at stake in any case where a 
criminal defendant has been subjected to a sentence based in part on the 
results of the algorithm.  
Still, government agencies cannot always be sure how the courts will 
respond to demands by firms for trade secrets protection and due process 
challenges from members of the public affected by automated 
decisionmaking tools.  Even apart from litigation, agencies ought to desire, 
for good government reasons, to provide as much transparency as they 
reasonably can over the pivotal algorithms they use.  The way to do so is for 
government officials to demand that contractors waive any claims of trade 
secret privilege with respect to the types of information the government needs 
to demonstrate to the public that an algorithm is well-designed and fair.  
 
59. Id.  For a similar proposal to create a type of in camera review for algorithms, see 
Pasquale, supra note 54, at 164. 
60. Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 32, at 34; see also Kroll et al., supra note 44, at 657 
(characterizing full transparency of “source code as well as inputs and outputs for the 
relevant decisions” as “naïve”). 
61. See, e.g., State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 761 (Wis. 2016) (rejecting a due process 
challenge even though the state’s contractor claimed its algorithm was “a proprietary 
instrument and a trade secret” and hence did “not disclose how the risk scores are 
determined or how the factors are weighed”).  
62. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 760; see also Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 32, at 34. 
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Critics may argue that requiring procurement officers to negotiate such 
provisions asks too much of government officials while needlessly 
complicating straightforward procurement processes.  However, like any 
contract negotiation, public procurement by design includes negotiations of 
all kinds—including over other issues of transparency or accountability.  For 
instance, after obtaining a series of contracts for algorithmic services by open 
records requests, Robert Brauneis and Ellen Goodman concluded that in 
many cases government contracts for technological services already “do 
not . . . uniformly accede to contractor wishes for nondisclosure and data 
ownership.”63  Brauneis and Goodman suggest that simply putting the onus 
on a vendor to redact specific information as protected by trade secrets 
helped in many cases decrease the number of overbroad assertions of trade 
secret protection.64  
Goodman has separately urged procurement officers to take responsibility 
for ensuring algorithmic transparency seriously, noting that government 
procurement officers have tremendous bargaining power in procurement 
transactions involving algorithms.65  Moreover, interested members of the 
public may well be eager for these government officials to use that bargaining 
power to “push back on the universe of what is called propriety” by 
vendors.66  Procurement officers should therefore negotiate for terms that 
allow the disclosure of the limited information needed by agencies to show 
both what their algorithms are supposed to do and why they are confident 
the algorithms work as intended.   
B. Data Privacy and Security 
AI implicates numerous data protection and privacy issues surrounding 
the collection, use, and disclosure of personal information.  Contracting for 
algorithmic accountability is one way to manage the various privacy and 
security risks associated with compiling and working with the large databases 
used to train government algorithms and operate AI tools.67   
 
63. Robert Brauneis & Ellen P. Goodman, Algorithmic Transparency for the Smart City, 20 
YALE J.L. & TECH. 103, 164 (2018). 
64. Id. 
65. Julia Powles, New York City’s Bold, Flawed Attempt to Make Algorithms Accountable, NEW 
YORKER (Dec. 21, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/tech/annals-of-technology/new-
york-citys-bold-flawed-attempt-to-make-algorithms-accountable. 
66. Id.  Powles notes “[t]his is especially the case in New York, whose size, wealth, and 
high-quality demographic data make it a more desirable client than most cities.”  She went 
on to note, “If New York doesn’t use that power to make systems accountable, who will?” 
67. AI systems depend on access to vast databases.  See generally Bernard Marr, What is 
Deep Learning AI? A Simple Guide With 8 Practical Examples, FORBES (Oct. 1, 2018, 12:16 AM), 
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To guard against the reputational, financial, and technical consequences 
of data breaches, government agencies using AI technologies should 
contractually require vendors to implement reasonable security measures 
and make their equipment and data available for routine conformity 
assessment with security standards.68  Procurement officers may also insist on 
clauses requiring vendors to notify government officials in the event of such 
a breach and that vendors cooperate with government agencies in 
responding to any intrusion.  The government should stipulate that it 
reserves the right to inspect proprietary information, such as algorithmic 
source code, following suspected or actual access by unauthorized threat 
actors. 
Procurement officers would also do well to negotiate contractual guardrails 
on proper and improper uses and disclosures of personal information 
 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2018/10/01/what-is-deep-learning-ai-a-simpl
e-guide-with-8-practical-examples/#19ebdb428d4b (explaining “deep learning” as a process 
by which algorithms learn from a vast set of data).  The existence of these databases almost 
invites attack—particularly when they contain personally identifying information.  Attacks on 
massive public data sets appear increasingly common.  See, e.g., Alan Blinder & Nicole Perlroth, 
A Cyberattack Hobbles Atlanta, and Security Experts Shudder, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/27/us/cyberattack-atlanta-ransomware.html 
(reporting, on a 2018 ransomware attack against the City of Atlanta, Georgia); U.S. Department 
of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, Review of CBP’s Major Cybersecurity 
Incident During a 2019 Biometric Pilot (Sept. 21, 2020), https://www.oig.dhs
.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2020-09/OIG-20-71-Sep20.pdf (reporting on the investigation 
of an unauthorized release of facial recognition data due to a cyberattack on a government 
subcontractor’s computer). 
68. For examples of basic cybersecurity protections which vendors ought to employ, see 
FED. TRADE COMM’N, START WITH SECURITY: A GUIDE FOR BUSINESS, LESSONS LEARNED 
FROM FTC CASES (2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/plain-langua
ge/pdf0205-startwithsecurity.pdf.  See generally Revision of OMB Circular No. A-130, 
“Managing Information as a Strategic Resource,” 81 Fed Reg. 49,689 49,689 (July 28, 2016), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/circulars/A130/a130revised.p
df (detailing the Office of Management and Budget’s guidelines on information technology 
procurement, including requirements for securing personally identifiable information through 
measures such as access controls and data retention and deletion policies); Cybersecurity Framework, 
NAT. INST. FOR STANDARDS & TECH., https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework (last visited May 
18, 2021) (describing the cybersecurity framework released by the Department of Commerce).  
Reports from the early months of the Biden Administration indicate that the President plans to 
release an executive order focused on cybersecurity, which may further affect which security 
measures are treated as “standard” by industry and government alike. See, e.g., Jennifer Jacobs & 
Michael Riley, Companies Must Quickly Report Hacks to U.S. Under Proposed Order, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 
31, 2021, 3:13 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-03-31/companies-
must-report-hacks-to-u-s-within-days-in-draft-order. 
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contained in relevant datasets.69  Vendors should be expected to comply with 
all applicable federal laws and policies related to the handling of personal 
information.70  Contractual provisions could also prohibit vendors from 
retaining personal information accessed while completing a government 
project for any other business purpose, even if that data is first de-identified.  
AI tools have the ability to sort through different inputs (including live 
video feeds) and make forecasts about personal characteristics of 
individuals that governments should otherwise treat as private.  One 
striking example of such profiling in the private sector involved a company 
that used AI to identify customers who were pregnant based on their 
purchase history and then sent these customers marketing materials about 
maternity products.71  The provisions of government contracts could ex-
pressly address such practices, prohibiting vendors from programming 
algorithms to make unnecessary forecasts about the personal characteristics 
of individuals who are subject to the algorithm’s automated decisionmaking 
processes.72  Straightforward contractual safeguards like these could mean-
ingfully insulate individuals’ personal information from unauthorized access 
and disclosure, shore up public goodwill, and protect agencies against future 
privacy-related controversies. 
 
69. Government contracts could also address what rights individuals affected by the use 
of automated tools will have to access their personal information from vendors and to dispute 
or correct any errors in such data.   
70. The federal government is subject to at least two federal privacy laws constraining their 
use of personally identifiable information.  E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, 
§§ 511, 523, 116 Stat. 2899, 2965, 2968 (codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. § 3501); Privacy Act 
of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a).  For additional guidance on privacy considerations, procurement 
officers might look to various federal legislative proposals on privacy.  For an overview and 
comparative analysis of these proposals, see generally ELEC. PRIV. INFO. CTR., GRADING ON A 
CURVE: PRIVACY LEGISLATION IN THE 116TH CONGRESS (2019–2020), https://www. 
epic.org/GradingOnACurve/EPIC-GradingOnACurve-Apr2020.pdf.  See also SEN. FEINSTEIN, 
ET AL., PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION FRAMEWORK 1 (2019), https://www.democrats. 
senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Final_CMTE%20Privacy%20Principles_11.14.19.pdf. 
71. Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2012), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html?pagewanted=1&
_r=1&hp.  Although this example involves a private company rather than government 
agency, it dramatizes the type of arguably lawful but still invasive algorithmic processing that 
government contracts should anticipate. 
72. The privacy of data subjects whose personal information is subject to automated 
decisionmaking is an important topic.  See, e.g., EUR. COMM., ETHICS GUIDELINES FOR 
TRUSTWORTHY AI: HIGH-LEVEL EXPERT GROUP ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (2019), 
https://ec.europa.eu/futurium/en/ai-alliance-consultation (“Digital records of human 
behavior may allow AI systems to infer not only individuals’ preferences, but also their sexual 
orientation, age, gender, religious or political views.”).  
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C. Algorithmic Impact Statements and Audits 
Procurement officers should also consider whether to negotiate 
contractual provisions that require vendors to follow substantive or process-
based standards related to the responsible design and implementation of AI 
tools, whether those standards are developed by the contracting agency or 
by voluntary standards organizations, such as the IEEE.73  If government 
contracts do make such standards contractually binding, they should also 
subject contractors to a requirement for regular auditing to assess conformity 
with the standards.  After all, contractual terms are of little value if 
contractors do not adhere to them.74 
For instance, a procurement contract might require that vendors  develop 
algorithmic “impact statements” or risk management plans.75  Such 
management-based requirements would compel vendors to pause, reflect on 
possible adverse consequences of a particular course of action, and find ways 
to minimize those adverse effects.76  Impact statements are widely used to 
address other types of concerns, such as the impacts of industrial pollution 
on the environment.77  Adapting the impact statement framework to AI 
technology could involve government agencies requiring their vendors to 
agree to: (1) articulate the purpose of any contemplated use of artificial 
intelligence; (2) identify potential technical, transparency, equity, and other  
  
 
73. Various industry groups and professional societies, including the Association for the 
Advancement of Artificial Intelligence, the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 
and the Association of Computing Machinery (ACM), have developed or are developing 
ethical frameworks for technologists.  See, e.g., ASS’N FOR COMPUTING MACH. U.S. PUB. POL’Y 
COUNCIL, STATEMENT ON ALGORITHMIC TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 2 (2017), 
http://www.acm.org/binaries/content/assets/public-policy/2017_usacm_statement_algori
thms.pdf.  The seven principles proposed by the ACM even include recommendations on a 
“right to an explanation” as well as a need to create software that can be easily and 
independently audited.  Id. 
74. See generally Kevin McGillivray, FedRAMP, Contracts, and the U.S. Federal Government’s 
Move to Cloud Computing: If an 800-Pound Gorilla Can’t Tame the Cloud, Who Can?, 17 COLUM. SCI. 
& TECH. L. REV. 336, 363–64 (2016) (chronicling federal government missteps in the 
acquisition of cloud computing solutions and recommending changes to the procurement 
process––namely through the use of more detailed standardized contractual clauses and more 
engaged internal compliance processes).  
75. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing 
Private Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 L. & SOC. REV. 691 (2003) (discussing regulatory 
strategy according to which entities are required to engage in their own risk management). 
76. See Katyal, supra note 46, at 112 (summarizing existing applications of the impact 
statement framework). 
77. Id. at 112. 
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problems to avoid; and (3) describe ways the vendor plans to address those 
problems and manage any risks associated with the use of the algorithm.78  
To help ensure vendors take impact statement requirements seriously, 
their statements, management plans, and all other documentation produced 
in conformity with the contract provisions should serve as the foundation for 
third-party or agency-conducted audits of government AI systems.  
Procurement officers should ensure that AI contracts call for such audits to 
occur at regular intervals—perhaps annually or semiannually—and that 
vendors fully cooperate with the auditors.79 
Because algorithms, especially those used by government entities, 
implicate a variety of concerns beyond simple mathematical accuracy, 
audits will likely need to be interdisciplinary, taking into consideration not 
only statistical analysis but also ethical considerations.80  Thorough audits 
will demand time and expense, but, with greater experience, AI auditors 
should be expected to develop more routinized protocols to address the 
ethical considerations.  An AI audit industry may even emerge in time, one 
“with proper credentialing, standards of practice, disciplinary procedures, 
ties to academia, continuing education, and training in ethics, regulation, 
and professionalism.”81 
 
78. For analysis of what an impact statement might look like in the context of algorithmic 
accountability, see generally id. at 112–15.  For another proposal on public agency algorithmic 
impact assessments, see DILLON REISMAN, ET AL., AI NOW, ALGORITHMIC IMPACT 
ASSESSMENTS: A PRACTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR PUBLIC AGENCY ACCOUNTABILITY 4 (2018), 
https://ainowinstitute.org/aiareport2018.pdf (identifying five elements which ought to be 
included in algorithmic impact assessments, such as “conduct[ing] a self-assessment of existing 
and proposed automated systems, evaluating potential impacts on fairness, justice, bias, or 
other concerns . . . .” and “provid[ing] notice to the public disclosing their definition of 
‘automated decision system[s],’ . . . and any related self-assessments and researcher review 
processed before the system has been acquired”).  
79. Government officials and their auditors need to be mindful of the risk that impact 
statements and their audits could turn into exercises of “pencil whipping” or “Potemkin 
villages”—that is, with vendors simply going through the motions without attending 
seriously to potential problems with their algorithms.  See NAT. ACAD. OF SCI., ENG’G, & 
MED., DESIGNING SAFETY REGULATIONS FOR HIGH-HAZARD INDUSTRIES (2018); Garry C. 
Gray & Susan S. Silbey, Governing Inside the Organization: Interpreting Regulation and Compliance, 
120 AM. J. SOCIO. 96 (2014).  See generally Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash, Compliance 
Management Systems: Do They Make a Difference?, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF COMPLIANCE 
(D. Daniel Sokol & Benjamin van Rooij, eds.) (forthcoming 2021). 
80. James Guszcza et al., Why We Need to Audit Algorithms, HARV. BUS. REV. (Nov. 28, 
2018), https://hbr.org/2018/11/why-we-need-to-audit-algorithms. 
81. Id.  For discussion of codes of conduct and self-regulation within the AI community, 
see Katyal, supra note 46, at 108–11.  
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Requiring audits to ensure compliance with industry standards is far from 
a novel concept.  Auditing of financial statements, for example, is a well-
accepted good business practice.82  The rationale behind regular financial 
auditing has a certain symmetry with the rationale for AI audits: just as 
algorithms can be opaque, “companies’ internal operations appear as ‘black 
boxes’ to those on the outside.”83  Requiring regular, independent audits of 
the ways algorithms actually work could help provide government agencies 
(and the members of the public that they serve) greater assurances that 
vendors are designing and deploying AI responsibly.84  Although even the 
most thorough audit framework does not guarantee compliance, auditing is 
nevertheless valuable, if only to the extent it can help improve accountability 
and strengthen public trust in government use of AI. 
D. Opportunities for Public Participation 
In designing and implementing AI tools, as well as developing contracts 
about them, agency officials and procurement officers have a variety of 
consultative processes at their disposal to draw on the knowledge of expert 
and non-expert members of the public.85  Leveraging these processes could 
assist both procurement officers tasked with navigating the field of AI as well 
as help agency officials and vendors improve their design and use of AI tools.   
When government procures AI services, its contracts should thus consider 
providing for vendors to cooperate with appropriate opportunities for public 
participation.  Public participation can be useful at the beginning of the design 
and development of algorithmic tools as well as during ongoing evaluation.86  
These tools demand that someone make choices about their goals and the 
 
82. Guszcza et al., supra note 80.   
83. Id.  
84. Id.  Moreover, independent auditors could “provide reasonable assurance that the 
reports coming from the ‘black box’ [of the algorithm] are free of material misstatement.”  Id.  
Of course, we have no illusions that audits by themselves, especially if they are paid for by the 
contractors who are being audited, will prove a panacea.  See Max H. Bazerman, George 
Loewenstein, & Don A. Moore, Why Good Accountants Do Bad Audits, HARV. BUS. REV. (2002), 
https://hbr.org/2002/11/why-good-accountants-do-bad-audits (describing auditors’ 
incentives to produce favorable audits and explaining how unconscious bias impacts audits); 
Coglianese & Nash, supra note 79 (reporting research showing compliance management 
systems’ limited discernible impact).  
85. For a general discussion of different participatory processes and their potential 
benefits, see OECD, FOCUS ON CITIZENS: PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT FOR BETTER POLICY AND 
SERVICES (2019), https://www.oecd.org/governance/regulatory-policy/focusoncitizens
publicengagementforbetterpolicyandservices.htm.  
86. See Mulligan & Bamberger, supra note 18, at 845–850. 
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various tradeoffs that they can present, such as between accuracy and equity.87  
These are choices that data scientists alone cannot answer; government 
officials, informed by suitable modes of public engagement, must be involved.  
By negotiating for contractual terms that require vendors to participate in 
public participation processes, government agencies can help ensure that AI 
tools better match the values and priority of the public and that they enjoy 
greater public acceptance when put into use.88  
Contracts might provide, for example, for vendors to cooperate with 
agencies in providing “notice-and-comment” opportunities about key choices 
to be made in designing new AI tools.  Contractual provisions could also call 
for vendors to become involved with members of the public in still more 
sustained, ongoing discussions around the use of AI.  For instance, the United 
Kingdom has experimented with the use a “‘citizens’ jury’ to explore the use 
[of] AI to make, or help make, decisions.”89  A citizens’ jury approach could 
take a variety of forms—from one-off consultative meetings with focus groups 
to a more sustained series of deliberative dialogues between a randomly-
selected, representative group of participants, expert technologists, and 
policymakers.90  By anticipating in advance, during the contracting stage, these 
possibilities for public engagement, government officials can ensure that their 
vendors will view their participation in such sessions as integral to their work. 
Recommendations from citizen juries such as these need not be treated as 
binding to provide meaningful feedback from the public.91  The City of Bos-
 
87. Sandra G. Mayson, Bias In, Bias Out, 128 YALE L. J. 2218, 2248–2250 (2019). 
88. Of course, creating robust public engagement protocols presupposes the existence of 
an informed, curious, and critical public.  See generally Jakko Kemper & Daan Kolkman, 
Transparent to Whom? No Algorithmic Accountability Without a Critical Audience, 22 INFO., COMM. & 
SOC’Y 2081 (2019) (emphasizing the need for a critical audience in order for many algorithmic 
accountability schemes to function as designed).  
89. ROYAL SOC’Y FOR THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF ARTS, MFRS., & COM., ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE: REAL PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT (2018), https://www.thersa.org/globalass
ets/pdfs/reports/rsa_artificial-intelligence---real-public-engagement.pdf. 
90. According to proponents of the longer-term, sustained citizens’ jury, this type of effort 
is necessary because of “the normative nature of policymaking and, thus, the need for integrating 
deliberative dialogue in governance alongside empirical analysis and logical reasoning.”  Id. at 
18.  For a review of different modes of public participation, see Michael Sant'Ambrogio & Glen 
Staszewski, Democratizing Rule Development, 98 WASH. UNIV. L. REV. 793 (2021). 
91. The goal of public engagement also need not be to find unanimity among members 
of the public, which may be impossible.  See Cary Coglianese, Is Consensus an Appropriate Basis 
for Regulatory Policy?, in ERIC ORTS AND KURT DEKETELAERE, EDS., ENVIRONMENTAL 
CONTRACTS: COMPARATIVE APPROACHES TO REGULATORY INNOVATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES AND EUROPE 93–113 (2001) (discussing the pitfalls of public participation processes 
that seek unanimity, or near unanimity). 
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ton, for example, launched a major AI-driven reconfiguration of the city’s 
school bus schedules, only to encounter major public backlash against the 
AI-generated schedules, which were not sufficiently designed to optimize the 
values held by the city’s parents and students.92  The city would have been 
well-served if it had organized listening sessions or focus groups with parents 
and students—and if it had included provisions in its contract to have the 
technologists who developed the new schedules assist in organizing such 
sessions, or at least to participate in them. 
III. SOCIAL PROCUREMENT IN THE ALGORITHMIC STATE 
Industry, government, and the broader public are grappling with both the 
promise and the problems of the ever-changing world of AI.93  Most 
observers would seem to agree that machine learning offers government a 
great potential for improved efficiencies,94 even if they disagree on whether 
and how that potential should be harnessed.  One way to govern the use of 
AI tools by government would be to establish overarching rules.  But rules 
can be blunt instruments.  And fears about the dangers of unaccountable 
algorithms could well lead to undue restrictions and even blunter bans 
altogether on governmental use of machine-learning algorithms. 
In 2017, for example, a member of the New York City Council introduced 
a bill that would have required every vendor who built an algorithm for the 
city government to make the underlying source code publicly available.95  In 
short order after the bill’s introduction, private firms objected, citing 
potential harm to their competitive advantage and urging an incremental 
approach to transparency.  Policy experts raised the specter of cybersecurity 
vulnerabilities and warned against “giv[ing] bad actors an easy way to game 
the public-benefits system.”96  Even city administrators declared as a non-
starter the adoption of an overly broad requirement that AI firms publish all 
 
92. Ellen P. Goodman, Defining Equity in Algorithmic Change, REG. REV. (Feb. 11, 2019), 
https://www.theregreview.org/2019/02/11/goodman-defining-equity-algorithmic-change/; 
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93. See generally Lehr & Ohm, supra note 1 (seeking to provide lawyers and technologists 
with a shared vocabulary for discussing machine learning and technology policy).  For 
additional information regarding AI and machine learning policy developments after this 
Article has gone to print, see generally Algorithmic Transparency: End Secret Profiling, ELEC. 
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of their proprietary information on an algorithm.97  A spokesperson for the 
mayor, for example, said that “‘[p]ublishing the proprietary information of 
a company with whom we contract would not only violate our agreement, it 
would also prohibit other companies from ever doing business with us, which 
would prevent us from trying innovative solutions to solve everyday problems 
through technology.’”98  What eventually followed was a more balanced 
approach: the creation of a task force charged with considering, in part, how 
to “mak[e] technical information [concerning algorithms . . . publicly 
available where appropriate.”99  
Our suggestion in this Article also pursues a more balanced approach—
and one that is ultimately incremental.  We suggest that governments give 
greater attention to how they design and structure their contracts for services 
to develop and operate AI tools.  Using contracting as a tool for algorithmic 
governance can allow governments and society to benefit from the 
improvements that AI tools can offer, while also helping ensure that these 
tools will be designed and deployed responsibly.  The public deserves to know 
about the algorithms that affect their lives and interests, and public 
knowledge about algorithms—or even just the potential for litigation seeking 
to review an algorithm—can itself provide some constraint on ill-considered 
and unfair algorithmic practices.  After all, if AI vendors can operate in total 
secrecy, protected by trade secrets, and never expected to meet basic 
standards for data security, privacy, algorithmic fairness, or public 
participation, then algorithmic accountability is nothing but a myth.  For this 
reason, procurement officers and the government officials they serve need to 
ensure that proper contractual duties and restraints are imposed on vendors’ 
development and deployment of algorithmic tools. 
Admittedly, the contracting process can already become protracted, and 
adding more terms to negotiate may only make procurement more 
cumbersome.  But when the stakes for society’s and individuals’ interests are 
high, the extra time and effort needed to craft suitably protective standards 
can certainly be worth the investment.100  As they move toward automating 
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a wider array of consequential governmental functions, agencies would do 
well to spend additional time and thought during the procurement process 
to consider the ramifications of new AI tools and their intended uses—as well 




As governments come to rely increasingly on AI tools to support tasks 
and functions that affect individuals and organizations, the demands for 
algorithmic accountability will only grow.  Important concerns have 
already emerged about the fairness and transparency of AI technologies 
used by some governmental authorities, and it is evident that these concerns 
can be exacerbated when government agencies contract out for the design, 
testing, and operation of AI tools.  Private contractors may possess the 
analytic capacity that government needs for developing and running AI 
systems, but private firms’ connections with the public will surely be more 
attenuated than will public agencies’ and their motives may not align as 
well with the delivery of public value.  Private vendors also tend to prefer 
to conduct their work with less oversight and disclosure, often claiming 
trade secret protection over their algorithmic tools.  
Nevertheless, government contracting itself can operate as an important, 
tractable governance strategy.  To use AI tools responsibly, agencies should 
seek to contract responsibly for the support and technology need to create 
such tools.  Specifically, agency officials and procurement officers should 
attend to four key issues.  First, they should ensure that AI contracts are 
drafted to ensure sufficient public transparency and to prevent vendors from 
claiming trade secret protection over all of their work.  Second, government 
contracts should obligate AI vendors to follow accepted privacy and security 
protocols—and to allow the government to access information needed to 
ensure those protocols are followed.  Third, agencies should consider 
negotiating contracts that include substantive standards for responsible AI 
and that insist vendors follow procedures, such as periodic audits, to 
document their compliance with such standards.  Finally, whenever agencies 
anticipate the need for public participation to inform the design and 
operation of AI tools, their AI contracts should obligate private vendors to 
cooperate in the agency’s process of public engagement. 
Contracting for algorithmic accountability is an immediately feasible 
strategy for governing a rapidly evolving and highly varied set of 
technological innovations.  Government contracts can be designed and 
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adapted so that they address the important, practical needs that lead 
government agencies to develop AI tools, while also respecting society’s 
desire for public accountability and engagement.  By using the procurement 
process to achieve greater algorithmic accountability, public officials can 
help provide a path toward a future in which AI is deployed responsibly to 
improve governmental performance. 
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